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STATEMENT 
In compliance with Rule 24(a)( 1), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, it is noted on this page 
that the Utah State Division of Commerce, Division of Corporations & Commercial Code 
("Division"), was, at times, a party to the proceedings below. The Division was named as a Party 
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dated October 26, 2004. Thereafter, the Division was brought back in as a Third-Party Defendant 
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Party Defendant by an Order of the Court, dated November 9, 2005. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DONALD E. TERRY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
WILKINSON FARM SERVICE COMPANY, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 20060855 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an Appeal from a final Order denying Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
granting Appellee's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
because original appellate jurisdiction in the Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
§78-2-2(3)(j), has been transferred to the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §78-2-
2(4). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue No. 1: Did the Trial Court commit error in concluding that current Utah statutory 
Brief of Appellant 
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law (1992 Revised Utah Business Corporation Act) was determinative as to the legal status of 
Appellee, and that, therefore, Appellant was required to exhaust administrative remedies and failed 
to do so? 
Standard of Review: The Appellate Court grants no deference to the District Court's 
Conclusions of Law and reviews them for correctness. [Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56; Grvnberg 
vs. Ouestar Pipeline Company (2003), 70 P.3rd, Page 1; 469 Utah Advanced Reports, Page 13; 2003 
Utah, 8, rehearing denied; Waddoups vs. Amalgamated Sugar Company (2002), 54 P.3rd, 1054,452, 
Utah Advanced Reports, Page 58; 2002 Utah, Page 69, rehearing denied.] 
Issue No. 2: Did the Trial Court commit error in concluding that the "doctrine of laches" 
is applicable in this case? 
Standard of Review: The Appellate Court grants no deference to the District Court's 
Conclusions of Law and reviews them for correctness. [Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56; Grvnberg 
vs. Ouestar Pipeline Company (2003), 70 P.3rd, Page 1; 469 Utah Advanced Reports, Page 13; 2003 
Utah, 8 rehearing denied; Waddoups vs. Amalgamated Sugar Company (2002), 54 P.3rd, 1054; 452, 
Utah Advanced Reports, Page 58; 2002 Utah, Page 69, rehearing denied.] 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Statutes: Portions of Utah Revised Business Corporation Act (1992 Act) and previous 
Utah Business Corporation Act (1961), namely, §16-10a-1701 ofRevisedAct; §16-10a-1704(l)of 
2 
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Revised Act; §16-10a-128(3) of Revised Act; §16-10-100 of previous Utah Business Corporation 
Act; § 16-10-101(3) of previous Utah Business Corporation Act; Article 3, Title 16 (Dissolution) of 
previous Utah Business Corporation Act; Declaratory Judgment Act, §78-33-1, §78-33-2 and §78-
33-12; also, Administrative Procedures Act, §63-46b-14(2). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case: 
In 2002, Appellant (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Terry"), by inheritance, became 
owner of one (1) share of stock in the Appellee (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Wilkinson") 
company. Thereafter, Terry entered into discussions with Wilkinson concerning a buyout of his 
minority ownership interest. As negotiations continued, Terry believed he was not getting a fair 
value for his stock. During this process, Terry learned through his own research that Wilkinson's 
original Articles of Incorporation and charter, approved by the State of Utah November 1, 1927, 
placed a limit on the "duration" of Wilkinson at fifty (50) years. 
In February 2003, Terry made demand upon Wilkinson that, because of its expired status, 
it wind up its affairs, make an accounting, pay its creditors and distribute any net equity to Terry and 
other shareholders. Instead, in March 2003, at the invitation of the Division of Corporations 
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Division") Wilkinson filed Amended and Restated Articles 
3 
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of Incorporation, which Articles were thereafter approved by said Division purporting to make 
Wilkinson's existence perpetual. 
As the process referred to in the next proceeding paragraph was unfolding, Terry, through 
counsel, communicated with the Division his objection to the process, advising the Division that, 
if it continued to concur with Wilkinson's position as to corporate status, a Declaratory Judgment 
would likely follow. In response, the Division took the position that, because Wilkinson "presumed 
they had perpetual duration", the Division was accepting their submitted April 2003 Amendment. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court: 
A declaratory action followed. The Division was later joined as a Party Defendant and then 
dismissed by Terry. Thereafter, they were brought back into the case by Wilkinson as a Third-Party 
Defendant and later dismissed by the Court. Ultimately, Terry and Wilkinson presented Cross-
Motions for Summary Judgment. Following Oral Argument, the Trial Court issued its Ruling in the 
form of the Order herein appealed, dated August 24, 2006, denying Terry's Motion and granting 
Wilkinson's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. As part of its Order, the Trial Court also granted 
a separate Motion by Wilkinson to strike an Affidavit that had been filed by Terry in support of his 
original Motion. In granting Wilkinson's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, the Trial Court 
concluded that: 
1. Terry was required to, and failed to, exhaust administrative remedies before filing his 
4 
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Declaratory Judgment action. The Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the 
declaratory action because of this failure on Terry's part. 
2. The Court also concluded that, even assuming it had jurisdiction, the "doctrine of 
laches" was applicable to this case, given the factual history, as contained in the Court file. Based 
on laches, the Court ruled that equity should prevent Terry from going forward. 
It is from the Court's Order denying Terry's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 
Wilkinson's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment that this appeal is taken. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
In 2002, Terry inherited one (1) share of stock in Wilkinson. This share of stock had been 
inherited from his mother, LaVaun W. Terry. LaVaun W. Terry's father was S. C. Wilkinson, an 
incorporator and President of Wilkinson at its inception in 1927. Lorraine Burdett, the current 
President of Wilkinson, is another daughter of S. C. Wilkinson and the sister of Terry's mother, 
LaVaun W. Terry. 
Wilkinson was organized and incorporated in 1927. Its original Articles of Incorporation and 
charter placed a limitation of fifty (50) years on Wilkinson's duration. Terry first learned that 
Wilkinson's charter had expired by its terms in early 2003 while trying to negotiate a buyout of his 
inherited share. He came to believe that the only way he could get fair value for his interest was to 
force a liquidation and a winding up of company affairs. In March 2003, at the invitation of the 
5 
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Division, Wilkinson filed Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation purporting to make its 
existence "perpetual", which document was thereafter approved by the Division. 
Wilkinson filed an Affidavit of Lorraine Burdett in support of its Counter-Motion for 
Summary Judgment, wherein it was disclosed that Terry's mother, LaVaun W. Terry, was, at one 
time, a Vice President of Wilkinson. Of equal importance from a factual standpoint, are the letters 
that were exchanged at the time the Division invited Wilkinson to file Amendments to their Articles. 
On March 14, 2003, Kathy Berg, on behalf of the Division, sent a letter to Wilkinson inviting them 
to "cure" the problem by submitting an Amendment, making their existence perpetual. Ms. Berg 
also sent a letter to Terry's counsel explaining the Division's position. In both letters, the Division 
excused the predicament by referencing the fact that, following 1977, it had unwittingly sent annual 
report forms to Wilkinson, and Wilkinson had unwittingly filled them out and filed them. [See 
Exhibit "A" letters in Addendum.] Everyone "presumed" they were legal. Also, note the factual 
position that Wilkinson took when they wanted the Division to be part of the litigation. In its 
Memorandum in support of a Motion to Dismiss Terry's original Complaint for failure to join the 
Division as an indispensable party, Wilkinson argued that they (Wilkinson) historically believed in 
their legality, because they and the Division continued to exchange annual report forms, and the 
Division listed them as in "good standing" on the Division's records. 
The Trial Court characterized the above circumstances by finding "that the principals in the 
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corporation, including Plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest, had knowledge, actual or imputed, that its 
charter had expired in 1977 and, yet, because they continued to receive and file annual renewals with 
the Division, understood and believed they had a sort of "de facto" existence." 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT NO. 1 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
APPLYING CURRENT LAW [1992 REVISED BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT] 
TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
In Wilkinson's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, it did not contest the fact that its 
charter had expired in November 1977. Rather, it argued, and the Court accepted, the argument that, 
because current law (Utah Code Annotated, §16-10a-128) empowers the Division to make 
conclusive determinations as to corporate status, and, because the Division in this case not only 
treated Wilkinson as "legal" but also invited it to "cure" its problem through Amendments to its 
Articles, that, therefore, such treatment by the Division is conclusive. 
From that premise, Wilkinson then argued, and the Court accepted, that, under current law, 
Terry was required to challenge this determination by the Division by proceeding under the Utah 
Administrative Procedure's Act. [Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-14(2).] Having failed to do so, 
the Court ruled that it was without jurisdiction to consider Terry's claims. 
The Court erred. Terry acknowledges that, under present Utah statutory law (in effect since 
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1992), the Division has initial, conclusive authority to determine corporate status. Terry also 
acknowledges that, under current law, the Division also has exclusive authority to administratively 
dissolve a corporation for, among other things, "because its period of duration has expired". [Utah 
Code Annotated, §16-10a-1420(5).] But the analysis and conclusion by the Court is based upon a 
couple of false premises, namely: (1) That Wilkinson was a viable corporation in 2003 when the 
Division accepted its Amended Articles; and (2) that the Revised Business Corporation Act, enacted 
in 1992, applies in this case. It is Terry's position that Wilkinson was not a viable corporation in 
2003, having suffered "corporate death" after November 1977 as a matter of law. In addition, the 
1992 Revised Act is not the statutory law applicable in this case, as the present Act only applies to 
corporations "in existence" on July 1,1992. [See Utah Code Annotated, §16-10a-170L] The 1992 
Revised Act also has "savings provisions", saving the operation of prior statutes and rights affixed 
or accruing prior to the repeal of the previous statute. In summary, this case must be decided by the 
law in effect in 1977, not 1992. Administrative appeal of the action taken by the Division in 2003 
was unnecessary based on the statutory case law in effect in 1977. 
The 1992 Act requires administrative action in order to dissolve a corporation whose charter 
has expired. [Utah Code Annotated, § 16-10a-1420(5).] In other words, if Wilkinson had been a legal 
and viable corporation in 1992, with a charter that thereafter expired, the Division would have had 
taken administrative action in order to dissolve them, and the Court's analysis concerning 
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conclusiveness of their determination and the need for administrative review of their determination 
would be correct. But, the fact of the matter is that Wilkinson was not a legal corporation in 1992, 
as its existence had dissolved as a matter of law with the expiration of its charter in 1977. 
Under the old statute, the Attorney General's Office was required to initiate Court action in 
order to dissolve corporations that had failed to comply with administrative procedures or in cases 
where there were other violations resulting in "involuntary dissolution". [Utah Code Annotated, §16-
10-89 (1972).] Absent from the former statute was language requiring a Court to pronounce 
"involuntary dissolution" based upon a corporation's charter having expired. This supports Terry's 
argument that the older statute recognized that corporate status terminates as a matter of law by 
reason of the expiration of its charter, without the necessity of Attorney General action and Court 
Order. 
What then is Wilkinson's status after November 21,1977, under the statutory and case law 
in existence at that time? Terry submits that Wilkinson suffered "civil and corporate death" from, 
and after, that date and belated attempts to reinstate its corporate life are void and of no force and 
effect. 
"A corporation is automatically dissolved on the expiration of the period for which 
it was created, without any direct action on the part of the state or the members of the 
corporation. It has no further existence, either de jure or de facto." [19 Am. Jur. 2nd 
Corporations, §2737.] 
"After the expiration of a period of an existence specified in the charter of a 
9 
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corporation, it becomes incapable of exercising any powers, except those which may have 
been conferred upon it by statute for the purpose of winding up its affairs." [ 19 Am. Jur. 2nd 
Corporations, §2883.] 
In 1957, Utah's corporate statute was amended and, for the first time, Utah law allowed 
perpetual duration. [Utah Laws, 1957, Chapter 23.] An article in the Utah Law Review, written that 
same year, pointed out that, despite the change in law now permitting perpetual duration, many new 
filings still contain limitations on duration. The article noted: 
"No explanation for this limitation seems possible, other than the fact that lawyers 
were not cognizant of the change authorized by the legislature." With the arbitrary limit thus 
imposed on the life of a corporation carried no legal significance, this oversight could be 
dismissed as harmless. The fact is, however, that the limitation has major implications. The 
significance of these can be appreciated when it is recognized that many Courts have held 
a corporation ceases to exist, even de facto, once its charter has expired." [Quoting from 
Fletcher on Corporations, §3842]; [7 Utah Law Review, Page 13 (1957).] 
In summary, the Trial Court applied the wrong statute, because Wilkinson did not exist in 
1992 to benefit from the procedures afforded in the new statute for dissolving corporations, including 
those whose charters had expired. The correct analysis under the old statute results in Wilkinson 
suffering "corporate death" as a matter of law and having no existence after 1977. 
ARGUMENT NO. 2 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF "LACHES" IN THIS CASE 
The Trial Court concluded that the long delay by Terry and his predecessor-in-interest, 
LaVaun W. Terry, in raising the issue of Wilkinson's status, now precludes Terry from relief under 
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the equitable doctrine of "laches". In reaching this conclusion, the Court found "actual or imputed" 
knowledge concerning the corporation's 1977 charter expiration. But the Court also found, however, 
that, at the time the aforesaid charter expired and in subsequent years, "the principals in the 
corporation, including Plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest... understood and believed they had a sort 
of de facto existence." [Emphasis ours.] 
As indicated, the statutory and case law in effect in 1977 recognized that corporations with 
expired charters had neither de jure or de facto existence but, instead, suffered "corporate death" by 
operation of law and without the need for dissolution by administrative or judicial action. In other 
words if, in applying the correct law, Wilkinson suffered corporate death and ceased to exist after 
November 1977 (except for winding up), then the belief by the principals (including Terry's 
predecessor-in-interest) in some sort of "de facto" existence was mistaken. 
In order to "successfully assert laches one must establish that (1) plaintiff unreasonably 
delayed in bringing an action, and (2) defendants were prejudiced by that delay." rNeilson-Newev 
and Company vs. Utah Resources Intl., 905 P.2d 312, 314 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).] 
In our case, the Trial Court reached a conclusion that Terry unreasonably delayed his action, 
despite finding that his predecessor-in-interest and other principals in the corporation always 
believed they had some kind of legal existence. Terry submits that this finding cannot support the 
conclusion that he "unreasonably" delayed bringing his action. It shows that his predecessor-in-
11 
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interest and the other principals in the company were acting under a mistaken belief that they had 
some sort of de facto existence. The delay in this case was not ''unreasonable" given the mistake that 
they shared. 
In Goodman vs. Lee, 76 Federal 3rd 1007 (Fifth Circuit 1996), the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals was considering a laches defense to a Declaratory Judgment action brought by the co-author 
of the rock classic "Let the Good Times Roll". The Defendants in the case were heirs of the other 
co-author. Plaintiff had delayed seeking relief from 1956 to 1984, and the defense claimed that 
laches should apply. The jury had found Plaintiffs delay was excused, because the original 
copyright failed to list her as a co-author, and she otherwise was not aware, and could not have been 
aware, of the problem. In affirming the Trial Court award, the Appeals Court stated: 
"The Lees cannot establish that the delay by Goodman in filing her action was in 
excusable." [At page 1014.] 
The facts in this case are even more compelling. No one, it seems, was aware of the legal 
consequences of Wilkinson's charter expiring in 1977. Everyone assumed that the company 
continued to have some sort of legal standing. This mutual, but mistaken, understanding was not 
unreasonable given the fact that the Division continued to treat Wilkinson as a viable corporation. 
For the foregoing reasons, Terry's delay is excusable, and laches is not a defense. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above-stated, Terry requests that this Court reverse the Trial Court and 
12 
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remand the case with instructions for the Trial Court to enter a Judgment in favor of Appellant upon 
his Declaratory Judgment Complaint. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / V day of February, 2007. 
(fauXdujn./%iu~ 
MICHAEL F. OLMSTEAD 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant to H. THOMAS STEYENSON, Attorney for Appellee, 3986 Washington Boulevard, 
Ogden, Utah, 84403, thi§ /. %&m of February, 2007. 
Secretary 
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MICHAEL F. OLMSTEAD [2455] 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2650 Washington Boulevard, Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone (801) 625-0960 
Facsimile (801) 621-0035 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD E. TERRY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILKINSON FARM SERVICE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 030906753 
Judge MICHAEL D. LYON 
This matter came before the Court on a regularly scheduled hearing; Plaintiff was represented 
by his counsel of record, MICHAEL F. OLMSTEAD, Esquire; Defendant was represented by its 
counsel of record, H. THOMAS STEVENSON, Esquire; the Court having reviewed the briefs filed 
by the parties, and having heard arguments and representations of counsel, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. 
2. For the reasons set forth in Defendant's Motion, Defendant's Motion to Strike 
Affidavit is hereby granted. 
Order 
Civil No. 030906753 
3. Having concluded there are no material issues of fact and for the following reasons, 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted: 
a. The Division of Commerce ("Division") has determined that Defendant corporation 
is a corporation in good standing. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §16-10a-128, this 
determination is "conclusive evidence" as to the corporation's legal standing. Moreover, because 
Plaintiff was notified of the Division's determination, as evidenced by correspondence between the 
Division and Plaintiffs counsel, Plaintiff was aware of the Division's determination and failed to 
appeal said determination administratively. As a result, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-
14(2), Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Accordingly, this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to further consider the matter. 
b. Assuming the Court does have jurisdiction, this Court finds that the principals in the 
corporation, including Plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest, had knowledge, actual or imputed, that its 
charter had expired in 1977 and, yet, because they continued to receive and file annual renewals with 
the Division, understood and believed they had a sort of "defacto" existence. 
From the foregoing finding, the Court concludes that the "doctrine of latches" is applicable 
in this case. The Court concludes that there has been unreasonable delay in challenging corporate 
existence since 1977 when the Defendant's charter expired. The Court further finds that the 
Defendant corporation has been prejudiced by the long and unreasonable delay in making this 
2 
Order 
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challenge. 
DATED and signed this< MC day of August, 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
Entered: f,\/?/fa 
/ 
MICHAEL D. LYON, District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
H. THOMAS«TEVENSON 
Attorney for Defendant 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
MICHAEL O.LEAVITT 
Governor 
OLENE S. WALKER 
Lieutenant Governor 
Department of Commerce i\^-o 
TED BOYER 
Executive Director 
KLAREBACHMAN 
Deputy Director 
KATHY BERG 
Corporations & UCC Division Director 
14 March 2003 
Lorraine W. Burdett 
Wilkinson Farm Service Company 
2637 West 1800 South 
West Haven, Utah 84401 
Re: Duration of Wilkinson Farm Service Company, a Utah corporation 
Dear Ms. Burdett: 
You are listed as the current registered agent for the above mentioned corporation and as 
such are receiving this letter. When Wilkinson Farm Service Company was incorporated on 21 
November 1927, the original articles of incorporation listed a duration of 50 years. In 1960 the 
Utah Corporations Act was passed and in that act there was a provision allowing a perpetual 
duration for corporations. 
As the Utah Division of Corporations and Commercial Code has evolved to a computer 
system, the duration of corporations is not listed and all are treated perpetual unless a specific 
expiration is listed. I have investigated the issue and can find no evidence of your corporation 
having changed their duration to perpetual, thus your corporation should have expired in 1977. 
However, you have continued to receive annual reports and have continued to file those annual 
reports. 
We are happy to help you resolve this issue. Within 30 days of the date of this letter, 
please send us evidence of any filing or document that shows the corporation changed its duration 
to perpetual. If no document exists, please send an amendment to your articles of incorporation 
making such a change. If indeed, the corporation did intend to expire in 1977, please send me a 
letter stating that fact and we will expire the corporation immediately. 
Please contact our office you have further comments or questions. 
Glad to be of service, 
^iduf f^eA^\ 
Kathy Berg 
Division Director 
Cc: Michael F. Olmstead 
2650 Washington Blvd, Suite 102 
Ogden,Utah 8440 
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MICHAEL F. OLMSTEAD 
Attorney at Law 
2650 Washington Boulevard, Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone 801-625-0960 Facsimile 801-621-0035 
April 7,2003 
Utah State Department of Commerce 
Division of Corporations and Commercial Codes 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ATTENTION: Kathy Berg, Director 
Re: Wilkinson Farm Service Company/Corporate Status 
Entity No. 556727-0142 
Registration Date: November 2 J, 1927 
Expiration Date: Noverrtber 21, 1977 
Dear Ms. Berg: 
I received a copy of your letter to Lorraine W. Burdett, dated March 14, 2003, suggesting 
that this company has continued to have some kind of legal status, even though its corporate 
charter expired in 1977, and that the company can avoid dissolution by filing an Amendment to its 
Articles of Corporation, making its duration perpetual. The purpose of this letter is to address 
this position and to advise you that my client strongly disagrees 
You are likely reviewing Wilkinson's situation in the context of the present statute (§16-
10a-1420, 1421 and 1422, Revised Business Corporation Act) in concluding that corporations 
whose charters expire under the statute continue to exist until administratively dissolved by the 
division. This is arguably true, as to those corporations which had a legal existence at the time of 
the adoption of the present Act in 1992, but whose charters thereafter expired, since those 
corporations would have benefit of the new law, which suggests they continue to exist until 
administratively dissolved by the division. 
-rl 
Utah State Department of Commerce 
April 7, 2003 
Page 2 
The current law was not in effect in 1977 when Wilkinson's charter expired. At that time, 
Utah was operating under the Model Business Corporation Act, which had been adopted in 1961. 
Under that Act, expiration of a corporate charter was not included as a ground for administrative 
dissolution (as it is in the present Act) because the law, at that time and for decades prior thereto, 
stood for the principle that such corporations automatically dissolve and, thereafter, have neither 
"dejure" or "de facto" existence. They continue only for the purpose of winding up. (See 
5 Thompson Corporations, §6651; 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations. §2737.) Applying the then-
existing law to the instant case means that Wilkinson had no 'de jure"' or "de facto" existence 
after 1977 and, certainly, not when the present Act was adopted in 1992. 
Finally, I would point out that any attempt to salvage this company under the Revised Act 
would run afoul of Article XH, Section 3, of the Utah Constitution. In Keetchvs Cordner. 62 
P.2d 273 (Utah 1936), the Utah Supreme Court noted that this section prohibits any legislation 
that extends a charter or remits the forfeiture of any corporate charter. Wilkinson's charter was 
"forfeited" after November 21, 1977 The 1992 Revised Act cannot constitutionally remit, 
release or cancel that forfeiture. 
If you have not already done so, please run this issue by the Attorney General's Office for 
their opinion and advice. If you do not change course on this matter, I predict that a declaratory 
judgment action will follow. 
Please advise. 
Very truly yours, 
MICHAEL F. OLMSTEAD 
MFO/rm 
cc: Donald E. Terry 
H. Thomas Stevenson, Esquire 
Jeffrey S. Buckner, Assistant Attorney General 
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22 April 2003 
Michael F. 01mstead 
2650 Washington Blvd. Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Re: Wilkinson Farm Service Company, Inc 
Dear Mr* Olmstead: 
1 have reviewed your letter dated 7 April 2 003 and you state 
some concern about the status of Wilkinson Farm Service 
Company, Inc.(Wilkinson), a Utah corporation number 556727-
0142. 
Wilkinson was registered on 21 November 1927 and stated a 
duration of fifty years in the original articles of 
incorporation. Subsequent changes to the corporations act 
ultimately resulted in the availability of perpetual 
duration. Wilkinson presumed they had that perpetual 
duration; they continued to file annual reports and the 
division continued to send them. 
On 14 April 2003, Wilkinson filed Amended and Restated 
Articles of Incorporation to formally reflect this perpetual 
duration. The division has accepted and filed that document. 
Please contact me if you have further questions or comments. 
Respectfully* 
Kathy Berg 
Division Director 
Utah! 
East 300 South, Bo* 146705, Salt Late City, UT 84114-6705* telephone (801) 530-4849 • facsimile (801) 530-6433 • www commerceMtoh.gov ^ ^ ,'^'"p *>*»ccr' 
BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT 16-10-91 
tte of dissolution may be If 
office — Suspension — 
LWS of this state fails for 
s state or fails for 60 con-
istered agent to file with 
tement of the change, the 
ton under this section or 
d Commercial Code shall 
ided; 
its certificate of incorpo-
mg the delinquencies and 
of Corporations and Com-
tion to any fees required 
has been suspended under 
ion 59-13-63; 
of this state, will be dis-
nless the corporation has 
de shall include with the 
linquencies. 
notice of suspension the 
of incorporation, the cor-
ans and Commercial Code 
No corporation organized 
>vived under this chapter 
I the notice of suspension, 
any corporation also pre-
date character under Sec-
ed names filed on behalf 
available for use by any 
te or by any corporation 
ly person wishing to file 
ion 42-2-5 for four years 
this section may, within 
pon filing an application 
nt fees. Reinstatement of 
1 all assumed names filed 
under this section shall 
These notices and certifi-
>ne officer of the corpora-
ered agent of record, the 
' the corporation at their 
I 
most current mailing addresses appearing on the records of the Division of Corpo-
rations and Commercial Code. The notice of suspension shall be mailed by certified 
or registered mail. The certificate of dissolution may be mailed by regular mail. 
History: C 1953, 16-10-88 2, enacted by L 
1985, ch 178, § 57 
16-10-88.5. Repealed. 
Repeal. 
Section 16-10-88 5 (L 1973, ch 20, § 1, 1977, 
ch 58, §1, 1979, ch 57, §10, 1984, ch 66, 
§ 112, 1984 (2nd S S ), ch 15, § 34), relating to 
suspension of corporation for delinquencies, 
was repealed by Laws 1985, ch 178, § 72 
16-10-89. Involuntary dissolution — Grounds. A corporation may be dissolved 
involuntarily by a decree of the district court in an action filed by the attorney 
general when it is established that 
(a) The corporation procured its articles of incorporation through fraud, or 
(b) The corporation has continued to exceed or abuse the authority conferred 
upon it by law 
History: L 1961, ch 28, § 89,1973, ch 20, 
§2 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1973 amendment deleted provisions for 
dissolution where corporation has failed to 
file its annual report, where corporation 
powers, rights and privileges have been sus-
pended, and where the corporation has failed 
to appoint and maintain a registered agent in 
the state 
16-10-90. Involuntary dissolution — Notification to attorney general. The 
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall certify annually to the attor-
ney general the names of all corporations which have given any cause for dissolu-
tion under Section 16-10-89 The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code 
shall concurrently mail to the corporation at its registered office a notice that such 
certification has been made. Upon the receipt of such certification, the attorney 
general shall file an action in the name of the state against such corporation for 
its dissolution 
History: L 1961, ch 28, § 90, 1973, ch 20, 
§ 3,1984, ch 66, § 113 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1973 amendment deleted provisions 
relating to the certification by the secretary 
of state of corporations which have failed to 
file annual reports and to the abatement of 
actions upon filing by the corporation 
The 1984 amendment substituted "Division 
of Corporations and Commercial Code" for 
"secretary of state" in the first two sen-
tences 
16-10-91. Involuntary dissolution — Venue and process — Notice. Every 
action for the involuntary dissolution of a corporation under sections 16-10-89 and 
16-10-90 shall be commenced by the attorney general by filing a complaint in the 
district court of the county in which the registered office of the corporation is situ-
ated and summons shall issue and be served If the summons is returned not served 
after three attempts have been made to serve the corporation at its registered 
office address or at any other address known to or readily ascertainable by the 
attorney general, the attorney general shall cause publication to be made in some 
newspaper published in or having a general circulation in the county where the 
registered office of the corporation is situated, containing a notice of the pendency 
of such action, the title of the court, the title of the action, and the date on or 
after which default may be entered The notice shall be published at least once 
each week for two successive weeks, and the first publication of it may begin at 
any time after the summons has been returned The attorney general shall cause 
63 
16-10-98 CORPORATIONS 
assets distributed to its shareholders, or in case its property and assets 
are not sufficient to satisfy and discharge such costs, expenses, debts and 
obligations, all the property and assets have been applied so far as they 
will go to their payment, the court shall enter a decree dissolving the 
corporation, whereupon the existence of the corporation shall cease. 
History: I*. 1961, ch. 28, § 97. 
16-10-98. Piling of decree of dissolution.—In case the court shall enter 
a decree dissolving a corporation, it shall be the duty of the clerk of such 
court to cause a certified copy of the decree to be filed with the secretary 
of state. No fee shall be charged by the secretary of state for the filing 
thereof. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 28, § 98. 
16-10-99. Deposit with state treasurer of assets due unknown creditor 
or shareholder.—Upon the voluntary or involuntary dissolution of a cor-
poration, the portion of the assets distributable to a creditor or shareholder 
who is unknown or cannot be found, or who is under disability, and there 
is no person legally competent to receive such distributive portion, shall 
be reduced to cash and deposited with the state treasurer to be held and dis-
posed of by him in accordance with the provisions of the Utah Unclaimed 
Property Act. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 28, § 99. Cross-Reference. 
Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Prop-
erty Act, 78 44-1 et seq. 
16-10-100. Survival of remedy after dissolution.—The dissolution of a 
corporation either (1) by the issuance of a certificate of dissolution by the 
secretary of state, or (2) by a decree of court when the court has not liqui-
dated the assets and business of the corporation as provided in this act, 
or (3) by expiration of its period of duration, shall not take away or impair 
any remedy available to or against the corporation, its directors, officers, 
or shareholders, for any right or claim existing, or any liability incurred, 
prior to such dissolution if action or other proceeding thereon is commenced 
within two years after the date of such dissolution. Any such action or 
proceeding by or against the corporation may be prosecuted or defended 
by the corporation in its corporate name. The shareholders, directors and 
officers shall have power to take such corporate or other action as shall 
be appropriate to protect such remedy, right or claim. If such corporation 
was dissolved by the expiration of its period of duration, such corporation 
may amend its articles of incorporation at any during such period 
of two years so as to extend its period of duration. 
History: I* 1961, ch. 28, § 100. 
Quiet title action. 
A dissolved corporation may maintain 
an action to quiet t i t le . Falconaero En-
terprise, Inc. v. Valley Investment Co, 
16 U. (2d) 77, 395 P . 2d 915. 
CoUateral Keferences. 
Corporations<£=>630(2). 
19 C.J.S. Corporations § 1775 
19 Am. Ju r . 2d 1014, 1018, Corporations 
§§ 1669, 1673. 
Criminal proceedings, maintainabil i ty 
164 
BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT 16-10-101 
against dissolved corporation, 40 A. L. E. 
2d 1396. 
Service of process upon dissolved do-
mestic corporation in absence of express 
s ta tutory direction, 75 A. L. R. 2d 1399. 
16-10-101. Continuation of corporate existence to wind up after disso-
lution.—Notwithstanding the dissolution of a corporation either (1) by the 
issuance of a certificate of dissolution by the secretary of state, or (2) by a 
decree of court, or (3) by expiration of its period of duration, the cor-
porate existence of such corporation shall nevertheless continue for the 
purpose of winding up its affairs in respect to any property and assets 
which have not been distributed or otherwise disposed of prior to such 
dissolution, and to effect such purpose such corporation may sell or other-
wise dispose of such property and assets, sue and be sued, contract, and 
exercise all other incidental and necessary powers. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 28, § 101. 
Cross-Reference. 
Remission of forfeiture, Const. Art . XI I , 
§ 3 . 
Effect of dissolution. 
Even though corporation was suspended 
for failure to pay franchise taxes and 
thus was placed under some disabilities, 
the suspension did not prevent i t from 
maintaining suit for negligence. Maekay 
& Knobel Enterprises, Inc. v. Teton Van 
Gas, Inc. , 23 U. (2d) 200, 460 P . 2d 828. 
CoUateral References. 
Corporations<§^>618. 
19 C.J.S. Corporations §§ 1728, 1743. 
19 Am. Jur . 2d 1015, Corporations 
§ 1669. 
Arbi trat ion proceedings, dissolved cor-
poration's power to part icipate in, 71 A. L. 
R. 2d 1121. 
Criminal proceedings, maintainabil i ty 
against dissolved corporation, 40 A. L. R. 
2d 1396. 
Dissolution of corporate lessee as affect-
ing lease, 147 A. L. R. 360. 
Dissolution of corporation on ground of 
intracorporate deadlock or dissension, 13 
A. L. R. 2d 1260. 
Dissolution of corporation which exe-
cuted mortgage, or purchased property sub-
ject to it, 128 A. L. R. 572. 
Personal l iabil i ty on contract made by 
" t rustee" or others in closing affairs of 
dissolved corporation, 76 A. L. R. 1478. 
Power of corporation after expiration or 
foifeiture of i t s charter and effects of dis-
solution, 47 A. L. R. 1288, 97 A. L. R. 477. 
Power of equity to appoint receiver for, 
or wind up, solvent corporation at instance 
of stockholders, on ground of fraud, mis-
management or dissension, 43 A. L. R. 
242, 61 A. L. R. 1212, 91 A. L. R. 665. 
Reinstatement of repealed, forfeited, ex-
pired, or suspended corporate charter as 
validating acts in interim, 13 A. L. R. 2d 
1220. 
Right of corporation to prefer creditors, 
19 A. L. R. 320, 38 A. L. R. 90, 48 A. L. R. 
479, 56 A. I/. R. 207, 62 A. L. R. 738. 
Right of receiver or other liquidator of 
insolvent corporation to recover back pay-
ments improperly made during receiver-
ship or liquidation, 105 A. L. R. 1519. 
Waiver or l imitation by contract be-
tween stockholders of their s tatutory r ight 
to cause dissolution of corporation, 154 
A. L. R. 269. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Authority of directors. 
Board of directors in winding up affairs 
of corporation on forfeiture of i ts charter 
had authori ty to confess judgment on in-
debtedness of corporation. Henriod v. Eas t 
Tintic Development Co., 52 U. 245, 173 
P. 134. 
Duty of directors. 
Where corporation's charter was for-
feited, i t was duty of directors, who were 
trustees for s tockholder and creditors, to 
assemble its assets, l iquidate i ts indebted-
ness, and generally conduct i ts affairs in 
such manner as would properly expedite 
winding up of corporation's business. 
Houston v. Utah Lake Land, Water & 
Power Co., 55 U. 393, 187 P . 174, 47 
A. L. R. 1282. 
Effect of dissolution. 
Where charter of corporation was for-
feited for failure to pay license tax, i t 
could not subsequently purchase stock »f 
another corporation and engage in busi-
ness tha t was beyond scope of i t s power 
165 
16-10a-124 CORPORATIONS 
5 ^ 1 
(b) in the case of a court order or decree pursuant to 
Section 16-10a-1008, tha t the court order or decree was 
entered by a court having jurisdiction of the proceeding 
for the reorganization of the corporation under a specified 
s ta tu te of the United States. 1992 
16-10a-124. Correct ing filed documents . 
(1) A domestic or foreign corporation may correct a docu-
ment filed with the division if the document: 
(a) contains an incorrect statement; or 
(b) was defectively executed, attested, sealed, verified, 
or acknowledged. 
J
 (2) A document is corrected by delivering to the division for 
filing articles of correction that: 
(a) describe the document, including its filing date, or 
have a copy of it attached to the articles of correction; 
(b) specify the incorrect s ta tement and the reason it is 
incorrect or the manner in which the execution, attesta-
tion, sealing, verification, or acknowledgement was defec-
tive; and 
1
 (c) correct the incorrect s ta tement or defective execu-
tion, attestation, sealing, verification, or acknowledge-
ment. 
(3) Articles of correction may be executed by any person 
designated in Section 16-10a-120(6), or by any person who 
executed the document that is corrected. 
(4) Articles of correction are effective on the effective date of 
the document they correct except as to persons relying on the 
uncorrected document and adversely affected by the correc-
tion. As to those persons, articles of correction are effective 
when filed. 1992 
16-10a-125. F i l ing duty of divis ion. 
(1) If a document delivered to the division for filing satisfies 
the requirements of Section 16-10a-120, the division shall file 
it. 
(2) The division files a document by stamping or otherwise 
endorsing "Filed" together with the name of the division and 
the date and time of acceptance for filing on both the document 
and the accompanying copy. After filing a document, except as 
provided in Sections 16-10a-503, 16-10a-1510, and 16-10a-
1608, the division shall deliver the accompanying copy, with 
the receipt for any filing fees, to the domestic or foreign 
corporation for which the filing is made, or its representative, 
a t the address indicated on the filing, or at the address the 
division determines to be appropriate. 
(3) If the division refuses to file a document, it shall return 
the document to the person requesting the filing within ten 
days after the document was delivered to the division, to-
gether with a written notice providing a brief explanation of 
the reason for the refusal. 
(4) The division's duty to file documents under this section 
is ministerial. Except as otherwise specifically provided in this 
chapter, the division's filing or refusal to file a document does 
not: 
(a) affect the validity or invalidity of the document in 
whole or part; 
(b) relate to the correctness or incorrectness of infor-
mation contained in the document; or 
(c) create a presumption tha t the document is valid or 
invalid or tha t information contained in the document is 
correct or incorrect. 1992 
16-10a-126. Appeal from division's refusal to file docu-
ment . 
(1) If the division refuses to file a document delivered to it 
for filing, the domestic or foreign corporation for which the 
filing was requested, or its representative, within 30 days 
after the effective date of the notice of refusal given by the 
division pursuant to Subsection 16-10a-125(3), may appeal the 
refusal to the district court of the county where the corpora 
tion's principal office is or will be located, or if there is none in ; M 
this s tate , the county where its registered office is or will be ^ 9 
located. The appeal is commenced by petitioning the court tgH i i 
compel the filing of the document and by attaching to the 
petition a copy of the document and the division's notice rtf 
refusal. 
(2) The court may summarily order the division to file the 
document or take other action the court considers appropriate 
(3) The court's final decision may be appealed as irr any 
other civil proceedings. ?
 I99* 
16-10a-127. Evidentiary effect of copy of filed docu 
ment . p^ 
A certificate attached to a copy of a document filed by the 
division, or an endorsement, seal, or s tamp placed on the^mnr /M*%i 
which certificate, endorsement, seal, or s tamp bears thej$fgl : \ J ^ 
nature of the director of the division, or a racsimile^1|ihg^^ 
director's signature, and the seal of the division, is concl§ifv#T ^ 
evidence that the original document has been filed with*tke^ 
division. A | | J i * 
16-10a-128. Certificates i s sued b y the division. > g^ L< - i 
(1) Anyone may apply to the division for a certific||e 0{JS ' 
existence for a domestic corporation, a certificate of aii torf.^ f) 
zation for a foreign corporation, or a certificate tha t setsfefli^;^ 
any facts of record in the office of the division. 3 ^ f "? ? 
(2) A certificate of existence or authorization sets fojIScr ^^H 
(a) the domestic corporation's corporate name^dff the^ 
foreign corporation's corporate name registered *" 
state; 
(b) that: 
(i) the domestic corporation is duly incofp 
under the law of this state and the da£f| 
incorporation; or 
(ii) the foreign corporation is authorized to £j*ai5|*^ 
act bus iness in this state; 
(c) that all fees, taxes, and penalties owed to t^j 
have been paid, if: 
(i) payment is reflected in the records of 
sion; and 
(ii) nonpayment affects the existence or aui 
tion of the domestic or foreign corporation; 
(d) that its most recent annual report reqi 
Section 16-10a-160 7 has been filed by the division^.^ 
(e) that articles of dissolution have not been Sleof 
(f) other facts of record in the office of the divii 
may be requested by the applicant. 
(3) Subject to any qualification stated in the certil 
certificate issued by the division may be relied if] 
conclusive evidence of the facts set forth in the certiffo 
M f e . \ 
i?¥ 
16-10a-129. Penal ty for s ign ing false document! 
(1) A person commits an offense if he signs a cbf 
knowing it to be false in any material respect, with inij 
the document be delivered to the division for filings* 
(2) An offense under this section is a class A misd | 
punishable by a fine not to exceed $2,500. 
PART 2 
INCORPORATION 
16-10a-201. Incorporators. ZJLst&h a 
One or more persons may act as incorporators of &f®0^^^M 
tion by delivering to the division for filing articles ^ ^ v f t g « J 
requirements of Section 16-10a-202. An incorporator/wW* . . j 
natural person must be at least 18 years old. *^§Hf*^" \ 
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the publication of the notice 
(3) If the dissolved corporation publishes a newspaper no-
tice in accordance with Subsection (2), then unless sooner 
barred under Section 16-10a-1406 or under any other statute 
limiting actions, the claim of any claimant against the dis* 
solved corporation is barred unless the claimant commence^ 
an action to enforce the claim against the dissolved corpora-
tion within five years after the publication date of the notice, ?/ j 
(4) (a) For purposes of this section, "claim" means any 
claim, including claims of this state, whether known, due 
or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or 
unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal 
basis, or otherwise 
(b) For purposes of this section, an action to enforce a 
claim includes any civil action, and any arbitration under 
any agreement for binding arbitration between the dis-
solved corporation and the claimant 1992 
16-10a-1408. Enforcement of c la ims against dissolved § 
corporat ions .
 t ^ 
A claim may be enforced \ 
(1) under Section 16-10a 1406 or 16-10a-1407 against 
the dissolved corporation, to the extent of its undistrib-
uted assets, or 
(2) against a shareholder of the dissolved corporation, 
if the assets have been distributed in liquidation, but a 
shareholder's total liability for all claims under this 
section may not exceed the total value of assets distrib-
uted to him, as that value is determined at the time of 
distribution Any shareholder required to re turn any 
portion of the value of assets received by him in liquids* 
tion shall be entitled to contribution from all other share* ^ 
holders The contributions shall be m accordance with the -* 
shareholders ' respective rights and interests and may not 
exceed the value of the assets received in liquidation 
CORPORATION 
in its 
1992 
corpo 
16-10a-1409. Service on dissolved corporation. 
(1) A dissolved corporation shall either ^ "^W-
(a) maintain a registered agent in this s tate to accept 
service of process on its behalf, or 
(b) be deemed to have authorized service of process 0» 
it by registered or certified mail, re turn receipt requested 
to the address of its principal office, if any, as set forth in 
its articles of dissolution or as last changed by notice 
delivered to the division for filing or to the address jbr 
service of process that is stated in its articles of dissolu-
tion or as last changed by notice delivered to the division 
for filing ^* 
(2) Service effected pursuant to Subsection (l)(b) is per-
fected at the earliest of 
(a) the date the dissolved corporation receives %he 
process, notice, or demand, 
(b) the date shown on the return receipt, if signed on 
behalf of the dissolved corporation, or 
(c) five days after mailing 
(3) Subsection (1) does not prescribe the only means, Of 
necessarily the required means, of service on a dissolved 
corporation 1992 
(3) the corporation is without a registered agent or 
registered office in this state, 
(4) the corporation does not give notice to the division 
tha t its registered agent or registered office has been 
changed, that its registered agent has resigned, or tha t its 
registered office has been discontinued, or 
(5) the corporation's period of duration stated 
^ articles of incorporation expires 
S2?C JlMOa-1421. Procedure for and effect of admmistra-
yp*%# tive dissolut ion. 
r{l) If the division determines that one or more grounds 
apst under Section 16 10a-1420 for dissolving a corporation, it 
**- shall mail the corporation written notice of 
^ (a) the division's determination that one or more 
ft * 2$ grounds exist for dissolving; and 
¥%^£*^~ (b) the grounds for dissolving the corporation 
$g£4m$® (a^ ^ ^ e corporation does not correct each ground for 
ij%*j J| dissolution, or demonstrate to the reasonable satisfaction 
&f£riiLff °f the ^ l v l s l 0 n that each ground does not exist, within 60 
days after mailing the notice provided by Subsection (1), 
^T the division shall administratively dissolve the corpora 
tion 
(b) If a corporation is dissolved under Subsection (2)(a), 
the division shall mail written notice of the admmistra 
tive dissolution to the dissolved corporation, stat ing the 
date of dissolution specified m Subsection (2)(d) 
(c) The division shall mail a copy of the notice of 
administrative dissolution to 
(I) the last registered agent of the dissolved 
ration, or 
(II) if there is no registered agent of record, a t least 
one officer of the corporation 
?
 ** (d) A corporation's date of dissolution is five days after 
the date the division mails the written notice of dissolu 
tion under Subsection (2Kb) 
(e) On the date of dissolution, any assumed names filed 
on behalf of the dissolved corporation under Title 42 
Chapter 2, Conducting Business Under an Assumed 
Name, are canceled 
(f) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(e), the name of the 
corporation that is dissolved and any assumed names 
filed on its behalf are not available for two years from the 
date of dissolution for use by any other person 
(I) transacting business in this state, or 
(II) doing business under an assumed name under 
Title 42, Chapter 2, Conducting Business Under an 
Assumed Name 
(g) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(e), if the corpora 
tion that is dissolved is reinstated m accordance with 
Section 16 10a 1422, the registration of the name of the 
corporation and any assumed names filed on its behalf are 
reinstated back to the date of dissolution 
(3) (a) Except as provided m Subsection (3)(b), a corpora 
tion administratively dissolved under this section contin 
ues its corporate existence but may not carry on any 
business except 
(I) the business necessary to wind up and liquidate 
its business and affairs under Section 16 10a 1405 
and 
(II) to give notice to claimants in 
( 
sec 
(( 
the 
dis< 
(6) A 
(< 
a 
app 
?# 
f*?** 
16-10a-1420. Grounds for administrat ive d i s so lu t ion 
The division may commence a proceeding under Sectiofi 
16 10a 1421 for administrative dissolution of a corporation J* 
(1) the corporation does not pay when they are due any 
taxes, fees, or penalties imposed by this chapter or other 
applicable laws of this state, 
(2) the corporation does not deliver a corporate of 
annual report to the division when it is due, 
the manner ^ ^ * w xii wic aim 
provided in Sections 16 10a 1406 and 16 10a 1407 
(b) If the corporation is reinstated m accordance with 
Section 16 10a 1422, business conducted by the corpora 
tion during a period of administrative dissolution is 
unaffected by the dissolution 
(4) The administrative dissolution of a corporation does not 
terminate the authority of its registered agent 
(5) (a) 
Upon the administrative dissolution of a corpora 
tion, the division shall be an agent of the dissolved 
corporation for purposes of service of process 
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id of the second calendar month following the calendar 
tonth in which the report form is mailed by the division Proof 
) the satisfaction of the division tha t the corporation has 
railed an annual report form is considered in compliance with 
u s subsection 
(5) If an annual report contains the information required by 
his section, the division shall file it If a report does not 
ontam the information required by this section, the division 
hall promptly notify the reporting domestic or foreign corpo-
ation in writing and re turn the report to it for correction If 
he report was otherwise timely filed and is corrected to 
ontam the information required by this section and delivered 
o the division within 30 days after the effective date of the 
notice of rejection, the annual report is considered to be timely 
filed 
(6) The fact t ha t an individual's name is signed on an 
annual report form is prima facie evidence for division pur-
poses tha t the individual is authorized to certify the report on 
behalf of the corporation 
(7) The annual report form provided by the division may be 
designed to provide a simplified certification by the corpora 
tion if no changes have been made m the required information 
from the last preceding report filed 
(8) A domestic or foreign corporation may, but may not be 
required to, deliver to the division for filing an amendment to 
its annual report reflecting any change in the information 
contained in its annual report as last amended 1992 
16-10a-1608. S t a t e m e n t of p e r s o n n a m e d a s director or 
officer. 
(1) Any person named as a director or officer of a domestic 
or foreign corporation in an annual report or other document 
on file with the division may if he does not hold the named 
position, deliver to the division for filing a statement setting 
forth 
(a) his name, 
(b) the domestic or foreign corporation's name, 
(c) information sufficient to identify the report or other 
document m which he is named as a director or officer, 
and 
(d) the date on which he ceased to be a director or 
officer of the domestic or foreign corporation, or a s tate 
ment tha t he did not hold the position for which he was 
named m the corporate report or other document 1992 
PART 17 
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS 
16-10a-1701. A p p l i c a t i o n t o e x i s t i n g d o m e s t i c c o r p o r a -
t i o n s . 
Except as otherwise provided m Section 16 10a 1704, this 
chapter applies to all domestic corporations m existence on 
July 1, 1992, th&t were incorporated under any general 
s tatute Of this s tate providing for incorporation of corporations 
for profit, and to actions taken by the directors, officers, and 
shareholders of such corporations after July 1,1992 1992 
16-10a-1702. A p p l i c a t i o n t o fo re ign c o r p o r a t i o n s . 
A foreign corporation authorized to transact business m this 
s tate on Ju ly 1, 1992, is subject to this chapter, but is not 
required to obtain a new certificate of authority to transact 
business under this chapter 1992 
16-10a-1703. P u b l i c a t i o n . 
The division shall annually publish copies of this chapter, 
together with applicable annotations and commentary, for sale 
and distribution to the public The division may charge a 
reasonable amount for copies of the chapter sold or distrib 
uted The proceeds from all sales and distributions shall be 
deposited into the Commerce Service Fund, and may be 
appropriated to the division for use in defraying past or future 
production, publication, republication, or distribution costs 
1992 
16-10a-1704. Sav ing provis ions . 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), the repeal of any 
s ta tute by this act does not affect 
(a) the operation of the s tatute or any action taken 
under it before its repeal, 
(b) any ratification, right, remedy, privilege, obligation, 
or liability acquired, accrued, or incurred under the stafc* 
ute before its repeal, -* 
(c) any violation of the statute, or any penalty, forfei-
ture, or punishment incurred because of the violation of 
the s tatute before its repeal, or 
(d) any proceeding, reorganization, or dissolution com 
menced under the s tatute before its repeal, and any 
proceeding, reorganization, or dissolution may be com-
pleted m accordance with the repealed s tatute as if the 
s tatute had not been repealed 
(2) If a penalty or punishment imposed for violation of a 
s tatute repealed by this act is reduced by this act, the penalty 
or punishment if not already imposed shall be imposed nt 
accordance with this act 
(3) The provisions of Subsection 16-10a-630(l) may not 
operate to deny preemptive rights to shareholders who, imme-
diately prior to July 1, 1992, were entitled to preemptive 
rights by reason of the failure of the articles of incorporation of 
the corporation of which they are shareholders to deny pr§* 
emptive rights, and the corporation shall be treated for all 
purposes as if its articles of incorporation included the state* 
ment "the corporation elects to have preemptive rights," until 
the date a resolution providing otherwise is approved by the -
same percentage of shareholders of each voting group as 
would be required to include the resolution in an amendment 
to the corporation's articles of incorporation Any preemptive 
rights existing by virtue of Subsection (3) are subject to the 
terms and provisions of Subsection 16-10a-630(2) ** 
(4) The provisions of Section 16 10a-704 may not operate is 
permit a corporation m existence prior to July 1,1992, to tak# 
action by the written consent of fewer than all of the share* 
holders entitled to vote with respect to the subject matter ^1 
the action, until the date a resolution providing o therwise^ 
approved either 
(a) by a consent in writing, setting forth the proposed 
resolution, signed by all of the shareholders entitled t& 
vote with respect to the subject matter of the resolution 
of *•**+ 
(b) at a duly convened meeting of shareholders, by tli0 
vote of the same percentage of shareholders of each votigg^ 
group as would be required to include the resolution in afi 
amendment to the corporation's articles of incorporation 
%$& 
-&? 
16-10a-1705. Severabil i ty c lause. 
If any provision of this act, or the application of any 
provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid* th# 
remainder of this act is given effect without the invalid 
provision or application 1"2 
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CHAPTER 33 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 
Jurisdiction of district courts — Form — Effect. 
Rights, status, legal relations under instruments 
or s tatutes may be determined. 
Contracts. 
Suit by fiduciary or representative. 
Court's general powers. 
Discretion to deny declaratory relief. 
Appeals and reviews. 
Supplemental relief. 
Trial of issues of fact. 
Costs. 
Parties. 
Chapter to be liberally construed. 
"Person" defined. 
78-33-1. Jur i sd i c t ion of district courts — Form — Ef-
fect . 
The district courts within their respective jurisdictions shall 
have power to, declare rights, status, and other legal relations, 
whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action 
or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground tha t a 
declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration 
may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and 
such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final 
judgment or decree. 1953 
78-33-2. Rights , s tatus, legal re lat ions under instru-
m e n t s or s tatutes may be determined. 
Any person interested under a deed, will or written contract, 
or whose rights, s ta tus or other legal relations are affected by 
a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may 
have determined any question of construction or validity 
arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or 
franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, s ta tus or other 
legal relations thereunder. 1953 
78-33-3. Contracts . 
A contract may be construed either before or after there has 
been a breach thereof. 1953 
78-33-4. Suit by fiduciary or representat ive . 
Any person interested as or through an executor, adminis-
trator, t rustee, guardian or other fiduciary, creditor, devisee, 
legatee, heir, next of kin, or cestui que trust , in the adminis-
tration of a trust , or of the estate of a decedent, an infant, 
lunatic or insolvent, may have a declaration of rights or legal 
relations jn respect thereto: 
(1) to ascertain any class of creditors, devisees, lega-
tees, heirs, next of kin or others; or, 
(2) to direct the executors, administrators or trustees 
-to do or abstain from doing any particular act in their 
fiduciary capacity; or, 
(3) to determine any question arising in the adminis-
tration of the estate or trust, including questions of 
construction of wills and other writings. 1953 
78-33-5. Court's general powers . 
The enumeration in Sections 78-33-2, 78-33-3 and 78-33-4 
does not limit or restrict the exercise of the general powers 
conferred in Section 78-33-1 in any proceeding where declara-
tory relief is sought, in which a judgment or decree will 
terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty. 1953 
78-33-6. Discret ion to deny declaratory relief. 
The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory 
judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if ren-
dered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or 
controversy giving rise to the proceeding. 1953 
78-33-7. Appeals and rev iews . 
All orders, judgments and decrees under this chapter may 
be reviewed as other orders, judgments and decrees. 1953 
78-33-8. Supplemental relief. 
Further relief based on a,declaratory judgment or decree 
may be granted whenever necessary or proper. The applica-
tion therefor shall be by petition to a court having jurisdiction 
to grant the relief. If the application is deemed sufficient, the 
court shall, on reasonable notice, require any adverse party, 
whose rights have been adjudicated by the declaratory judg-
ment or decree, to show cause why further relief should not be 
granted forthwith. 1953 
78-33-9. Trial of i s sues of fact. ,*^  
When a proceeding under this chapter involves the de ter l f 
mination of an issue of fact, such issue may be tried and" 
determined in the same manner as issues of fact are tried and 
determined in other civil actions in the court in which the^ 
proceeding is pending. 1953^ 
78-33-10. Costs. *£ 
In any proceeding under this chapter the court may makjtjk 
such award of costs as may seem equitable and just. J95if t 
78-33-11. Parties . 
When declaratory relief is sought all persons shall be mad<}$ 
parties who have or claim any interest which would bUf 
affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall p r e j u d i c e 
the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding. In an^i" 
proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal off^ 
county ordinance or franchise such municipality or coun% 
shall be made a party, and shall be entitled to be heard, and if 
a s ta tute or state franchise or permit is alleged to be inval|4 
the attorney general shall be served with a copy of tlj 
proceeding and be entitled to be heard. 
78-33-12. Chapter to be l iberally construed. 
This chapter is declared to be remedial; its purpose is |cfe 
settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity witM 
respect to rights, status and other legal relations; and is to b |& 
liberally construed and administered. " " 
78-33-13. "Person" denned. j | 
The word "person" wherever used in this chapter, shall 6$ 
construed to mean any person, partnership, joint stock coi| 
pany, unincorporated association or society, or municipal 
other corporation of any character whatsoever. l! 
CHAPTER 34 
EMINENT DOMAIN 
Section 
78-34-1. 
78-34-2. 
78-34-3. 
78-34-4. 
78-34-5. 
78-34-6. 
78-34-7. 
78-34-8. 
78-34-9. 
78-34-10. 
78-34-11. 
78-34-12. 
78-34-13. 
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ADMINISTRATIVE P R O C E D U R E S ACT 
7, Jurisdiction 
Agency has jurisdiction to act on motion for 
reconsideration after statutory 20-day presump-
tive denial period has passed. U.C.A.1953, 
$3-46b-13(3)(b). McCoy v. Utah Disaster 
Kleenup, 2003, 65 P.3d 643, 467 Utah Adv. Rep. 
23, 2003 UT App 49. Administrative Law And 
procedure <s=* 483 
. Statute deeming the State Tax Commission to 
-haVe denied a motion not ruled upon within 20 
" days of submission did not apply to motion for 
reconsideration, and thus, Commission had ju-
risdiction to grant, four months after the motion 
^was submitted, Collection Division's petition for 
reconsideration of Commission's final decision 
dismissing taxpayer from assessment action. 
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-13(3)(b). Prince v. Collec-
tion Div. of State Tax Com'n, 1999, 974 P.2d 
284, 1999 UT 11. Taxation <&> 1085 
§63-46b-14 
8. Appeal 
Where State Tax Commission issued order on 
taxpayers reconsideration request on January 
15, taxpayer's appeal filed on February 12 was 
timely, despite Commission's claim that motion 
for reconsideration had been deemed denied 
more than 30 days earlier. U.C.A.1953, 
63-46b-13(3)(b), 63-46b-14(3)(a). Knowledge 
Data Systems v. Utah State Tax Com'n Auditing 
Div., 1993, 865 P.2d 1387. Taxation <3> 1319 
Appeal from order of Tax Commission filed 
within 30 days of Tax Commission's denial of 
petition for reconsideration was timely, even 
though it was more than 30 days after the 
petition was deemed denied by virtue of Com-
mission's failure to make a timely ruling. 
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-13(3)(b). Orton v. Utah 
State Tax Com'n, Collection Div., 1993, 864 
P.2d904. T a x a t i o n ^ 493.3 
f s ^ ; 
M . 
§ 6 3 - 4 6 b - 1 4 . Judicial review—Exhaustion of administrative remedies 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, 
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
, (2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative 
remedies available, except that: 
?/, (a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative reme-
es if this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not required; 
) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement 
to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm dispropor-
ionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion. 
: (3)(a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action 
Within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the final agency action 
fe issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13 
|3)(b). 
;fc: (b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as 
^respondents and shall meet the form requirements specified in this chapter. 
;/iawS'1987, c. 161, § 270; Laws 1988, c. 72, § 24. 
Cross References 
«?»**'-*" Pension of Facilities Construction and Management, dispute resolution process, see § 63A-5-208. 
J?\>t>^ L i b r a r y Refe rences 
^ £ \ ^Adminis t ra t ive Law and Procedure <&=>662, CJ .S . Public Administrative Law and Proce-
msM^Z" 7 2 2 - dure §§ 185, 204, 209. 
f&£: ,5< Westlaw Key Number Searches: 15Ak662; 
l i f e : 15Ak722. 
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